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System reliability is a key aspect of electricity supply, and the ability to maintain 
system reliability thus is an important aspect of a liberalised electricity market. But 
system reliability can be ensured only if there is sufficient reserve capacity at all 
times. In a liberalised electricity market the provision of reserve capacity is a matter 
of incentives. The Nordic electricity market, comprising of the integrated Danish, 
Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish electricity markets, has worked well from a system 
reliability point of view. A key factor behind this favourable outcome is that the 
incentives for keeping sufficient reserve capacity have been strong enough. The 
reason for this is an adequate institutional design point. More precisely the set of 
markets that is commonly called “the electricity market” includes both regulation and 
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During the 1990´s major electricity markets reforms were implemented in the Nordic 
countries, i.e. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden
4. The reform process started in 
Norway 1991, continued in Sweden 1996 and Finland 1998
5, and was completed by 
Denmark in 2000. During the same period the national electricity markets were 
opened up for cross-border trade, and a common power exchange, Nord Pool, was 
established. Along with this development several markets have been established; 
including the Elspot which is a day ahead spot market, and Elbas, which is an hour 
ahead spot market used for adjustments (open to Finland, Sweden and recently also to 
Eastern Denmark). In addition to these markets, and the traditional bilateral market, 
there is a thriving derivatives market, where futures, forwards and options are traded 
actively from both inside and outside the Nordic region.  
 
The Nordic wholesale market has, thus, evolved and matured over several years and it 
seems to be a generally held view that it functions well by now (see von der Fehr et 
al. 2005). Also, the retail markets seem to be well functioning, at least at a national 
level (notably in Norway and Sweden), even though a true Nordic retail market with 
cross border sales has still not emerged (see Amundsen and Bergman, 2005).  
 
However, a well functioning electricity market is also dependent on a good 
organization of ancillary services and system operation, including provision of reserve 
capacity to ensure system reliability (see e.g. Hobbs et al., 2001; and Crampton and 
Stoft, 2005). In particular system reliability must be maintained also in periods with 
peak demand. But this can be ensured only if there is sufficient generating capacity at 
all times. Thus, in a liberalised electricity market the system reliability issue is closely 
linked to the incentives to keep reserve capacity to be used in periods with extreme 
demand peaks. The peak capacity problem is particularly important in the Nordic 
countries where instantaneous electricity demand to a large extent depends on 
temperature, and where extreme demand peaks appear regularly but with extended 
time intervals. 
                                                 
4 The fifth Nordic country, Iceland has just recently started to liberalize its electricity market and is not 
included in this analysis.   
5 The Finnish electricity market reform was implemented already in 1995, but it was not until 1998 that 
Finnish energy companies started to use Nord Pool for power trading. 
  2An often discussed issue is what kind of institutional framework that is suitable for 
efficient provision of peak capacity in a liberalised electricity market. One alternative 
is the “energy-only-market” approach, i.e. a market organisation with one or several 
forward markets and one real-time market for electrical energy. The underlying 
assumption is that high electricity prices during peak periods would induce generators 
to provide an efficient amount of peak capacity. The other alternative is the “capacity 
market” approach, which implies that a specific market for reserve capacity is added 
to the forward and real-time markets for electricity. 
 
The Nordic countries have each their own approach to handling system reliability and 
peak capacity issues and each of the countries has been in search of improvements of 
their existing systems. However, all the four countries have opted for the capacity 
market alternative. In recent years there has also been a closer contact between the 
system operators in the Nordic countries with the intension of obtaining a common 
design and organization of system operations.  In this respect a first step was taken in 
2002 as a common regulating power market, RKM was introduced. Still there is a 
long way to go before a common organization of ancillary services and system 
operations is obtained. 
 
However, in spite of these obstacles on the road to a common system the Nordic 
electricity market has worked remarkably well from a system reliability point of view. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe and discuss the institutional framework for 
managing the system reliability problem that has been adopted in the Nordic 
countries. To begin with, however, we will briefly discuss the nature of the system 
reliability problem in a liberalised electricity market and the choice between the 
“energy-only-market” and the “capacity market” alternatives. 
 
 
2. The development of generation capacity and electricity consumption  
After the deregulation process started the level of installed capacity has shown a 
rather slow development in the Nordic countries. As can be seen from Fig. 1 the total 
installed capacity in Sweden has even decreased, whereas the Norwegian generation 
capacity has only increased by some 3 percent over the last decade. The other Nordic 
  3countries, that started the deregulation process later than Norway and Sweden, have 
had a somewhat more pronounced expansion of generation capacity. 
  
Fig. 1. Total installed generation capacity in the Nordic countries 






















In order to put the development of capacity instalment in perspective, a comparison is 
made with the development of electricity consumption. Fig. 2 illustrates the relative 
development of both capacity instalment and electricity consumption in the Nordic 
countries since 1991. As can be seen from Fig. 2 consumption has increased by some 
15 percent whereas installed capacity has increased by about 9 percent. Hence, there 
is a clear picture of increasing discrepancy between the two features. Thus, one may 
wonder why capacity instalment is lagging behind. A pertinent question is whether 
this development in any way can be the result of an ill design of the new electricity 
markets in the Nordic countries.   
  4 
Fig. 2. Development of installed capacity and total electricity consumption in the 























As of now, there does not seem to be a clear answer to this question.  However, before 
concluding that the design of the Nordic electricity market gives insufficient 
incentives for capacity investment, one should recognize that the Nordic electricity 
market by the time the deregulation process started was characterized by a sizable 
excess generation capacity. Hence, one may claim that the relative decline of 
generation capacity as compared with electricity consumption can be seen as the 
result of a well functioning market involving a more efficient use of generation 
resources.  Also, one should bear in mind that harsher environmental regulation to a 
large extent has put constraints on which projects that are acceptable to society and 
which are not. For instance, expansion of water power projects in Norway and 
Sweden has more or less come to a halt due to environmental considerations and gas 
power plants have for a long time been prohibited in Norway for the same reasons
6.   
 
Still the development with respect to new capacity investments does give rise to 
concern among the Nordic system operators (the SOs). At times demand is close to 
maximum generation capacity, both within regions of the grid system and nationally. 
A well known case took place in Sweden on February 5, 2001 when an expected load 
of 29 GW was projected as compared with a total installation of 31,7 GW. On that 
                                                 
6 Some gas power projects have now been accepted by the authorities in Norway. However, there are 
strong requirements with respect to the emission of CO2 and efforts are made to install emission free 
power plants.  
  5occasion a plea by the SO (Svenska Kraftnät) to customers of reducing consumption 
probably solved the situation without the controlled “brownouts” that would 
otherwise take place. With the narrowing gap between maximal load and generation 
capacity situations like this are likely to appear more frequently and give, thus, rise to 
problems of sustaining the system. One problem, in particular, is that the spot markets 
may fail to clear at distinct prices such that the market mechanism ceases to function.  
 
Hence, it is an important challenge to design and implement a good system of reserve 
capacity and regulating power while taking due account of the interrelationships 
between the various markets already established. In the following sections we address 
some basic features and relationships related to this challenge.  
 
3. The nature of electricity as a consumer good 
As most other goods, electricity possesses, both a quantity dimension and a quality 
dimension. In quantity dimension electricity is a so-called private good. Basically this 
means that the electricity that is used by one consumer can not be used by another 
consumer. This feature is fundamental for the functioning of a market. A necessary 
condition for a market to emerge is precisely that individual private property rights 
can be defined and handed over to others. It is only if the good in question is a private 
good that this condition can be fulfilled.  
 
The quality aspect of electricity has to do with security of supply and is defined by the 
risk of interruption and by the stability of voltage and frequency. This quality is 
“produced” through the interaction between aggregate production and consumption in 
real time (and through the level of maintenance of the transmission and distribution 
network). If variation of voltage and frequency appear then all consumers connected 
to the grid will be affected. This relationship implies that security of supply is a so-
called public good in quality dimension i.e. a good for which individual property 
rights can not be defined (see Abbott, 2001). Hence, a so-called market failure exists 
such that it is impossible to organize an ordinary market for quality.  Just as for other 
public goods the responsibility of providing a suitable amount of “quality” will have 
to be transferred to an agent with a monopoly in performing this task. For the 
electricity market this agent is the system operator.  
  6 
The necessity of a continuous balance between production and consumption indicates 
that all electricity trade takes place in real time on a spot market i.e. on a market for 
contracts of immediate delivery. From the point of view of the electricity consumers 
such an organization of the electricity market would, however, imply a high cost of 
electricity purchase both in terms of time and resources spent. Instead, consumers are 
primarily interested in ensuring electricity for use and in a necessary amount when the 
need is there i.e. for lighting, heating, kitchen appliances and so on. For this reason 
the electricity contracts are predominately of optional character, that is, contracts that 
give the consumer the right to use electricity within a certain power limit and at a 
given price when the consumer wishes. The consequence of this is that electricity 
production at all times will have to be balanced with a demand that will be known 
with certainty first in the actual hour of consumption.    
 
The task of the system operator is made more complicated by the fact that even the 
production of electricity is uncertain until the actual hour of delivery. Thus the 
combination of demand and supply uncertainty and the requirement of continuous 
balance between supply and demand imply that the system operator must have at his 
disposal at least some generation plants that may be called upon for regulation 
purposes. This, thus, implies that a certain spare generation capacity will have to be 
available at all times to be ramped quickly if demand becomes larger than expected or 
some generation plant should fail. Conversely, voluntary reductions of demand may 
be used as an alternative to commanding operation plants.  
 
In the following we apply the term ”peak load capacity” to denote the maximum 
available power capacity
7 of the electricity supply system. Also, the term “reserve 
capacity” is applied to denote that part of peak load capacity that is not in use but is 
kept in reserve by the system operator for balancing short term variation of demand. 
Furthermore, we use the term “regulating power” for power needed in real time for 
balancing purposes.
8 The market for regulating power is denoted the “regulation 
market” or the “real time market”. With these concepts at hand, the task of the system 
                                                 
7 This is calculated in excess of so called disturbance reserves which is under the direct command of 
the system operator in e.g. the Swedish electricity system. 
8 The term “balancing power” will be applied to the financial settlement process taking place in the 
period after real time operations. See discussion of the Nordic regulating market in section 9. 
  7operator may be formulated as, at all times, keeping the sum of reserve capacity and 
(voluntarily) disruptible consumption at least as large as the sum of the maximum 
deviance between real and expected consumption that may appear.  
 
4. The need for intervention 
As seen from the point of view of a single electricity company, investment in new 
generation capacity, just as maintenance decisions for existing generation plants, is 
motivated by the net income that this capacity may give rise to in the future. This 
income may, in part, stem from contracts with retailing companies (or directly with 
end users) and in part from the system operator as compensation for using the 
generation capacity for balancing stochastic variation of demand.  
 
On a well functioning electricity market, the equilibrium price should at all times 
reflect the marginal cost of generating electricity.  In a pure thermal system this 
implies that the equilibrium price is high under periods of high demand as “short 
term”
9 generation capacity is in use and low in periods of low demand as “long term” 
generation capacity is in use. The high prices prevailing under peak load periods, thus 
ensures the profitability of generation plants that are only in use under such periods. 
In a hydro power system, where electricity generation easily can be reallocated 
between periods, this seasonal pattern is generally weaker, but still observable.    
 
If the electricity market is well functioning in this sense, then there is no reason why 
the system operator or any other party should affect or take responsibility for the 
provision of peak load capacity. However, there do exist some relationships that 
imply that the electricity market may function less efficiently. One is the existence of 
actual or expected regulation of prices. If the government should set a price cap under 
peak load periods, or the electricity companies believe that this will be the case, then 
the expected profitability of investments in plants intended for peak periods and thus 
the supply of peak load plants would be reduced.   
 
                                                 
9 ”Short term” capacity, is to be understood as generation capacity that is intended for use only in peak 
demand periods e.g. gas turbines. “Long term” capacity is generation capacity that is in use on an 
annual basis.   
  8Another reason why the electricity market may not function efficiently is market 
power.  If the market structure is such that the market has to rely on a single (or a few) 
producers to deliver power under peak load demand, this company may be in a 
position to exercise market power by restraining generation in order to raise price. If 
this is the case the provision of peak load capacity will be smaller than what is 
optimal from the point of view of society i.e. that the consumers’ marginal 
willingness to pay for electricity during the peak period is larger than the marginal 
cost of keeping and generating additional power during this period.    
 
A third reason why the electricity market may not function efficiently has to do with 
long term stochastic variation of demand in combination with risk aversion on the part 
of the electricity producers. During years with particularly harsh winters, the 
utilisation of peak load capacity will be high, in particular in regions with a large 
proportion of electric heating, and the market will clear at high prices. During years 
with mild winters the utilisation of peak load capacity will be low as will the price 
level for electricity. This implies that the investment in peak load capacity only will 
generate revenue in some of the years and nothing or little in other years.   
 
A risk neutral investor is willing to invest if the expected value of future earnings 
exceeds the investment cost. A risk averting investor will, however, need a higher rate 
of return in order to be compensated for the risk implied by the annual stochastic 
variation of income. This then implies that the combination of risk averting 
companies and stochastic annual variation of winter temperature may limit the supply 
of peak load capacity.  
 
Probably the most important reason why the electricity market does not function 
efficiently has to do with the typical kind of contract that dominates this market. As 
observed earlier a typical contract gives the consumer the right– at a fixed price 
settled prior to consumption (and sometimes within a given power constraint) - to use 
as much electricity as the consumer desires and at whatever time is suitable to the 
consumer. In addition the settled price is often fixed for a very long time. In practise 
this implies that the consumer prices during peak load periods are lower, or much 
lower, than the marginal cost of generating electricity during these periods, while the 
opposite is true during low load periods.   
  9 
As compared with an efficiently functioning electricity market this implies that 
consumption is too high under peak load periods and too low under low load periods.  
Hence, the diurnal and seasonal variation is increased and the need for peak load 
capacity becomes larger. Also, the profitability of investing in new peak load 
capacity, or to keep existing capacity in vigour, becomes smaller. This implies that 
that the probability of capacity shortage increases and that the periods during the year 
for which the provision of reserve capacity is too small become more numerous and 
longer. In extreme cases one may even risk that the electricity market can not clear at 
any price.  
 
However, it should be observed that the reasons mentioned above as to why an 
electricity market may function inefficiently are not “market failures” as such and, 
hence, do not by themselves call for intervention by the system operator or the 
government. In our opinion there is only one important market failure that calls for 
intervention in this setting and that is the “public good” aspect of security of supply. 
As for all public goods the supply will be too small as compared with what is socially 
optimal if supply decisions are left to private agents. Also, under most circumstances 
it is not possible for an individual customer to pay a generator for secure 
uninterrupted supply of electricity as electricity is generally supplied over a jointly 
used network that is governed by the laws of physics and not by contractual 
arrangements.
 10 Basically the implication of this is that the system operator, on behalf 
of the customers, will have to demand a sufficient real time reserve capacity to ensure 
a security of supply that corresponds to the socially optimal level i.e. at the level 
where the aggregate marginal willingness to pay is equal to the marginal cost of 
providing that level either by supply or demand responses.  The system operator 
should thus have a position as a monopsonist, though without exercising 
monopsonistic market power.  
 
It should, however, also be stressed that this does not necessarily mean that the system 
operator should intervene directly by commanding generators or consumers to act in 
certain ways to achieve the appropriate level of supply security; or by owning reserve 
                                                 
10 In theory, however, several suggestions exist as to how subscription of capacity may come about; see 
e.g. Doorman (2000), Hobbs and Iñón (2001) and Vázques et al. (2001).  
  10capacity itself. The system operator may well rely on market mechanisms to ensure a 
sufficient reserve capacity. However, before addressing such market mechanisms we 
first consider some factors that in part determine the need for reserve capacity and 
how an optimal level of supply security may be determined in principle.  
 
5. The need for reserve capacity 
The need for regulating power and thus for reserve capacity is in part determined by 
institutional matters and in particular by the relationship between the forward markets 
and the real time market. Three features may be pointed to.  
The time lag between the clearing of the spot market and real time operation 
In planning operations electricity generators normally base their decisions in part on 
conditions on the spot market and existing long term contracts and in part on 
prognoses of temperature and other conditions that affect electricity consumption in 
the given hour of operation. If there is a long time lag between the closing of the spot 
market and real time operations the conditions that affect electricity use on a short 
time basis (e.g. temperature) may well change. In general, therefore, the need for up 
or down regulation and thus the amount of trade on the real time balancing market 
will increase as the time distance between the clearing of the spot market and real 
time operations increases.  On the Nordic market there is a time lag of 12-36 hours 
between the closing of the spot market and real time operations. However, in Sweden 
and Finland (and recently also Western Denmark) companies with a balance 
requirement have an opportunity to adjust sales or purchases in the so called Elbas 
market that closes two hours prior to real time. This implies that the demand for 
reserve capacity will be rather small for these countries. This is contrary to Norway 
where companies do not have the opportunity to participate in the Elbas market. 
Consequently, the demand for reserve capacity is, ceteris paribus, larger in Norway.    
 
The incentives for being in balance 
An important factor determining the demand for reserve capacity ready to be used in 
real time, is the companies’ incentives of being in balance i.e. to have own production 
or contracted production that is equal to actual consumption stemming from those 
contracts that the companies have signed with their customers. In practise a large part 
of the trade on the spot market is motivated by the companies’ desire to be in balance.  
  11From the point of view of a single company lack of balance implies either a sale or a 
purchase of regulating power. If regulating power costs more or less the same as 
electricity bought on the spot market, a company may not make a large effort of being 
in balance. However, if it is very costly not to be in balance, the company may go at 
great lengths in trying to assess actual demand and to be able to balance this with own 
and/or contracted generation. Thus, in general, there is a negative relationship 
between the companies’ cost of not being in balance and the demand for regulating 
power. In particular, this is the case in Sweden where there is an asymmetric pricing 
of regulating power. Hence, a company (subject to a balancing requirement) having a 
deficit during a specific hour as there is a general need of up regulation, will have to 
pay a higher price of regulating power - the so called up regulation price - than a 
company with a surplus during this hour. In Norway there is no such asymmetric 
pricing and the incentives for being in balance are, ceteris paribus, less strong in 
Norway than in Sweden.  
 
The relationship between scarcity and end user prices  
A third factor of importance for the demand for regulating power is the correlation 
between end user prices and the price of regulating power. The demand for regulating 
power is, ceteris paribus, larger the smaller is the correlation between these two prices 
during the actual hour of operation. For Denmark and Finland and to a large part also 
for Sweden and Norway this correlation is rather weak. This implies that the end users 
have no economical incentives in adjusting their actual consumption to the level of 
actual scarcity on the electricity market.    
 
6. Optimal choice of reserve capacity 
 
Disruption of electricity delivery may come about as a result of acute technical 
problems in the transportation of electricity (e.g. in transmission, distribution, 
transformer stations etc). This is normally beyond the control of the system operator. 
However, disruption may also be due to intentional decisions made by the system 
operator by exercising his right to disconnect selected end users groups in order to 
  12avoid excessive strain electricity system. In this case we are dealing with “blackouts” 
that are directly dependent on an insufficient generation capacity
11.  
 
Lack of generation capacity during a given hour may come about if the difference 
between actual and expected demand becomes larger than the actual supply of reserve 
capacity
12. It may also come about as a result of random technical problems in 
generation plants that may thus reduce actual reserves as compared with expected 
reserves available. Assuming that the transportation system functions satisfactorily 
and that the spot market is clearing at a finite price, the risk of a “blackout” or a 
“brownout” will be linked to the availability of reserve capacity.  This capacity will in 
part consist of available generation capacity ( x ) and in part of voluntarily agreed 
disconnection of consumption ( y ). The sum of available reserves is denoted q . 
 
In the following we denote the risk of disruption/blackout due to lacking reserve 
capacity byρ  and assume the following relationship is valid: 
 
0 ' ); ( ≤ = ρ ρ ρ q  
 
Hence, we assume that the risk of disruption/blackout is non-positively related to the 
amount of available reserve capacity. The inverse of this relationship, i.e.  
 
0 ' ); ( ≤ = q q q ρ  
 
defines the amount of reserve capacity as function of the risk of disruption/blackout.   
 
Disruption, like large variations of frequency and voltage will imply costs and 
inconveniences for the consumers. The size of these costs and inconveniences vary a 
lot between the hours of the year. Blackouts, with direct consequences for heating and 
                                                 
11 Lack of generation capacity may concern all of the system or - due to ”bottlenecks”- only concern  
certain regions.  
12 This may in its turn rely on a fundamental imbalance between electricity demand and the electricity 
generators’ ability and be the result of regulations or other factors that imply that the forward markets 
do not function efficiently. The calamities on the California power market may be an example of this 
kind of situation.  
  13lighting, will cause great problem a cold winter’s evening whereas a similar blackout 
may hardly be noticed at all a light summer’s night.  
 
The costs and inconveniences caused by “blackouts” and “brownouts” define the 
consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for supply security, or quality; i.e. the 
maximum amount that the consumers are willing to sacrifice in order to reduce the 
risk,ρ , marginally. From the inverse relationship stated above the marginal 
willingness to pay for quality can be transformed into a marginal willingness to pay 
for reserve capacity. In so doing we let  denote consumer j’s marginal 
willingness to pay for reserve capacity during hour t. It seems reasonable to assume 




t MBV q . 
 
The principle of determining the optimal amount of reserve capacity as seen from the 
point of view of society may be stated in the following way: During each hour of 
operation  t the amount of reserve capacity should be set in such a way that the 
marginal cost of reserve capacity during this hour is equal to the consumers’ 
aggregate marginal willingness to pay for reserve capacity.  In particular it should be 
observed that the public good aspect of security of supply implies that the marginal 
willingness to pay should be summed over all affected consumers.  
 
The marginal cost of keeping reserve capacity during a given hour, MKt, reflects the 
revenue that the capacity in question otherwise could generate through contracts 
signed on the forward market. It seems reasonable to assume that MKt is increasing in 
q . As mentioned this cost varies a lot between the various hours of the year. 
Furthermore, these variations tend to be positively correlated with the variations in the 
consumers’s marginal willingness to pay for reserve capacity. For example, during 
cold winter days both the opportunity cost of generation capacity and the consumers’ 
imputed value of security of supply are high.  
 
The optimal amount of reserve capacity as seen from the point of view of society may 





t t t t q MBV q MK ); ( ) (  
  14However, in practise it is not possible to calculate all relevant  at an acceptable 
accuracy. Instead various assessments of costs caused by disruption and variation in 
voltage and frequency will have to be made and acceptable intervals of voltage and 
frequency, as well as a maximum acceptable probability of blackouts, are determined 
on the basis of these. Hence, with the notation at hand one may say that the system 
operator prescribes a maximum risk, , of disruption and/or unacceptably large 
variation in voltage and frequency. This risk may then be translated into a requirement 
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7. Optimal provision of regulating power and reserve capacity in sequential 
markets 
In the following we investigate basic principles of obtaining an efficient amount of 
reserve capacity i.e. the reserve capacity that minimizes the cost to society of attaining 
the level of supply security as determined by the system operator. In so doing we 
focus on the interconnection between the real time market and the forward market. 
The real time market is the instrument by which the system operator may buy and sell 
electricity so as to balance generation and consumption in real time.   
 
Given the typical end users contracts electricity demand during a given hour t, may be 
considered a stochastic variable. Hence, denoting the price of contracts on the forward 
market by p and the demand function for forward contracts by D=D(p) , real time 
demand during a given hour t may be expressed as  ε + ) (p D  where ε is the stochastic 
(negative or positive) part. As total electricity generation in real time will have to be 
equal to real time demand and as the producers’ generation of electricity in general 
are equal to the expected demand from settled forward contracts, ε will be equal to the 
demand on the balancing market. Furthermore, as the demand on real time reflects the 
settled forward price p, which is not influenced by the price of regulating power, ε  
will be completely inelastic with respect to p.  
 
In general each producer of electricity has three options available in employing his 
generation capacity i.e. generate in order to honour forward contracts engaged in, 
generate electricity for sale on the balancing market and keep capacity idle as reserve. 
The producer’s supply to the balancing market and, in general, the decision of how to 
  15allocate capacity among options, will simultaneously depend on the price on the 
forward market and the expected price on the balancing market (and on the price on 
the reserve capacity market, if available). Furthermore, supply to the balancing market 
may even stem from certain categories of end users, offering to reduce consumption 
through so called “voluntary disconnection”. On the demand side of the balancing 
market the system operator decides how much to purchase depending on actual real 
time demand and in accordance with the decided security of supply level. Demand for 
regulating power is positive if up regulation is needed and negative if down regulation 
is needed. The general efficiency criteria in the balancing market implies that the 
price of regulating power should be equal to the marginal cost of generating 
regulating power which in its turn should be equal to the marginal cost of voluntary 
disconnection of electricity consumption.    
 
In order to investigate these efficiency principles further and in particular the 
relationship between the forward market and the balancing market we assume that the 
system operator is able to determine both the supply of contracts on the forward 
market and the generation of regulating power.  For simplicity we now ignore that the 
regulating power may be “generated” by voluntary disconnection and we assume that 
the power industry is characterized by a constant marginal cost, c. Furthermore, we 
assume there is a given generation capacity, k available and that the task of the system 
operator is to determine how much of the generation capacity that should be available 
as reserves for up regulation during a future hour, t. We consider an hour with high 
demand, i.e. an hour in which all generation capacity could be applied for delivery as 
contracts on the forward market. Furthermore, we assume that the allocation of 
generation capacity between the forward market and the real time market is done prior 
to the closing of the forward market. Therefore, the need of up or down regulation can 
not be foreseen with certainty. However, we assume that the distribution of the “states 
of the world” pertaining to this, ε,  is known.  
 
For simplicity we assume that only three states of the world are possible i.e. 
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H=1. The task of the system operator is to maximize expected social 
surplus by determining the supply of contracts on the forward market subject to the 
constraint that sufficient regulating power be available in real time (i.e. so that the 
decided level of security of supply is satisfied). The amount of contracts on the 
forward market, z, must be equal to the expected demand that the settled price on the 
forward market gives rise to.  We assume that z is determined in such a way that the 
demand for regulating power may be satisfied according to the states of the world 
given above, i.e. such that  and  . Furthermore, the system operator 
needs to ascertain that the amount of available generation capacity, k-z is at least as 
large as regulating power needed for up regulation,  . 
L L x ε =






































This problem may then be formulated as a Lagrangian problem  
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In this expression the Lagrangian multiplier λ may be interpreted as a shadow price of 
regulating power whereas the Lagrangian multiplier φ may be interpreted as a shadow 
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The first of these conditions may be rewritten as  
{ } φ ε = −c z p E
i ) , ( 
 
Basically this relationship states that the amount of contracts sold on the forward 
market should be such that the expected price on the forward market is larger than the 
marginal cost of generating electricity. This reflects the essential point that a buffer 
generation capacity is needed in cases of extreme demand in order to ensure a 
sufficient level of supply security.   
 
It is important to observe that the amount of reserve capacity available during a given 
hour is determined prior to the demand of regulating power is known with certainty. 
This means that the probability of full capacity utilisation of reserves is only s
H. If the 
decided level of supply security is high, the reserves needed to cope with even 
extreme deviances between expected and actual electricity consumption during a 
given hour must also be high. This thus implies that s
H is close to zero such that there 
is normally idle reserve capacity. In spite of this the shadow price of reserve capacity, 
φ, will be positive for all hours as the sum of the reserve capacity that must be kept in 
cases of extreme demand constrains the supply on the forward market. In our model, 
the criteria for this to be the case may be expressed as. 
 
k c D
H ≥ +ε ) ( 
 
where D(c) is the electricity demand at the lowest possible price i.e. a price equal to 
the marginal generation cost. The implication of this condition is that the shadow 
price of reserve capacity is equal to zero only if the available capacity, k, is so large 
that it both covers maximum demand on the forward market and the most extreme 
deviance between actual and expected consumption.  
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The expressions on the left hand side may be interpreted as the shadow prices of 
regulating power realized provided that the corresponding “state of the world” is 
realized.  The implication of the first equality is that the shadow price of regulating 
power is equal to the marginal generation cost. The second equation states that the 
shadow price of regulating power is larger than the marginal generation cost if there is 
an extreme (positive) discrepancy between actual and expected consumption during 
the given hour.   
 
Assuming that the total amount of reserve capacity for a given hour is equal to k-
z=ε
H, and that each producer is paid a price for generating regulating power equal to 
the shadow prices determined above, the expected net income of the producers will be  
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An interpretation of this expression is that the electricity producers are paid 
compensation equal to φ for every unit of regulating power delivered in case of up 
regulation. In terms of a market outcome this interpretation corresponds to the 
“energy-only-market” case. Thus, the producers get p per unit of electricity sold on 
the forward (day-ahead) market, and φ for every unit sold on the real-time market. 
 
However, the expression above may also be interpreted in an alternative way. As the 
generation of regulating power is equal to demand in “all states of the world” and we 
have assumed that k-z=ε
H, the above expression may be rewritten  
 
) ( z k R
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  19The interpretation of this expression is that the producers, instead of being 
compensated for delivered regulating power, should be compensated for the supply of 
reserve capacity irrespective of whether it is called upon or not. More precisely the 
producers would be paid φ per MW of reserve capacity, and his net income would be  
φ(k-z).  In terms of a market outcome this interpretation of the necessary condition for 
an optimal allocation of resources corresponds to the “capacity market” case. 
 
Within the frame of the optimisation model the two cases are identical, and thus give 
the producers the same the expected net income. However, due to several factors the 
possibility of realising the optimal resource allocation as a market outcome differs 
significantly between the two cases. Thus the choice between the “energy-only-
market” and the “capacity market” alternatives has to be based on institutional and 
other real-world factors.  
 
8. A market for reserve power  
The main result stemming from the analysis in the previous section is that two prices 
may be called for in ensuring an efficient amount of reserve power as seen from the 
point of view of society. One is the price of regulating power actually delivered and 
one is the price of the capacity kept in reserve for possible generation of regulating 
power. The keeping of a buffer reserve may be considered a specific service. Without 
a specific price on this service a sufficient provision of reserve capacity during peak 
demand may not be guaranteed.  
 
The price on the delivered regulating power is the same as the equilibrium price on 
the balancing market. As for the price of keeping capacity for reserve there are two 
candidates, as indicated by the analysis in the previous section. One is that the price is 
determined as the difference between the price of regulating power and the marginal 
cost of regulating power at extreme discrepancies between actual and expected 
electricity consumption.
13. The other is that a price on reserve capacity is determined. 
 
                                                 
13 The system that was in use in England and Wales prior to the current system is the best known 
example of such a system. During periods of high load a capacity compensation was calculated on the 
basis of ”the loss of load probability” (LOLP) and ”the value of lost load” (VOLL). This cost element 
was shifted over to the consumers by adding an ”uplift” on the spot price for the actual half hour.  
  20In practice the first alternative, i.e. the “energy-only-market” alternative, implies that 
the producers are expected to keep given amounts of generation resources that almost 
never will be applied, and that the system operator is willing to pay a rather high 
compensation for the use of these resources during rare and short periods of time. 
Such a system will function efficiently only if firms are risk neutral. Another problem 
with this alternative is that the system operator does not know in advance how much 
capacity that actually will be kept in reserve. From the point of view of the system 
operator it would be better to have a “quantity based” system, i.e. some kind of 
“capacity market” system, where the amount of reserves is determined in advance. 
 
A market for reserve capacity may be organized as a bilateral contract market. It may 
also be an organized market like the Nord Pool futures market. In general, the 
objective of a market for reserve capacity is to ensure that a sufficient amount of 
power is available so that the settled requirement of supply security and quality may 
be attained at the least cost to society. At the same time it must function in such a way 
that regulating power is always generated at lowest cost, which implies that at least 
the largest customers should have the possibility of participating in the trade.  
 
A market is an institutional arrangement for trade with rights, e.g. the right to 
administer a certain commodity or to make use of a given service. The right traded on 
a market for reserve capacity is the right to manage a certain generation capacity 
during a period and/or the right to disconnect an amount of power during that period. 
For simplicity we denote this right be “power options”. The price on power options is 
assumed to be determined in an auction where both producers and consumers 
participate and where the system operator determines in advance how many rights of 
power reserves that is going to be purchased.   
 
In the following we consider three alternative types of power option contracts 
between a producer and the system operator. In all of the contracts the producer gets a 
certain compensation, equal to the price of the power option, for keeping generation 
capacity in reserve. The difference between these contracts is the rules by which the 
capacity owner is compensated for regulating power as the system operator is 
exercising his rights.   
 
  21a) Compensation based on a predetermined price of regulating power 
In this system the owner of the generating capacity system gets a predetermined price 
per MWh if and when the capacity is used for generating regulating power. Thus, this 
arrangement has the form of an option with a “strike price”. The system operator 
could, for instance, base the strike price on calculations of the marginal cost of power 
generated by the capacity lastly employed. As for a rational capacity owner, he will 
base his decision to issue an option of this kind on mainly three factors.  The first is 
his evaluation of the probability that the capacity in question is actually employed for 
regulating power generation during the given period. The second is the net income per 
generated unit if the capacity is called upon for regulating power generation (i.e. the 
difference between the predetermined price and marginal cost). The third is the net 
income which the capacity could give rise to if it were used on the forward market 
instead.    
 
From the point of view of society, however, it is essential that the capacities in 
generating regulating power are called upon in order of increasing marginal cost. For 
this reason, the offer from the capacity owner should contain both information on the 
requested compensation for putting the capacity unit at the system operator’s disposal 
and information on the marginal cost of utilising this capacity unit.  
 
b) Compensation based on reported marginal cost of regulating power  
An alternative way of compensation is that the capacity owner reports the marginal 
cost at which the capacity in question is able to generate regulating power and that the 
compensation for generating regulating power is based on the reported marginal cost. 
From the point of view of the system operator this implies that the capacities enter in 
terms of increasing cost for each hour and that the capacities are used in this order. As 
the compensation for regulating power is equal to the marginal cost of generating 
regulating power it is a matter of indifference for the capacity owner whether the 
capacity unit is used or not. The compensation needed for a rational capacity owner 
for issuing an option of this kind will therefore depend on the net income that the 
capacity unit may generate on the forward market.  
 
  22c) Compensation based on the equilibrium price of regulating power 
A third possibility is that a power option in practise is an obligation of participating in 
submitting supply bids on the real time market. The compensation paid to the capacity 
owner for the produced regulating power is then based on the equilibrium price on 
regulating power. For the system operator this implies that the real time market 
remains a regular auction market. For the capacity owners giving offers to the market 
for power options the system implies that they will have to evaluate both the 
probability for their capacities being utilized and the established price on regulating 
power on these occasions.  
 
If all parties have perfect information on all relevant factors the three alternatives will 
give the same result. However, in the more realistic case where information is not 
perfect and, in addition, asymmetrically distributed the differences can be significant. 
Assume for instance that the capacity owners possess better information than the 
system operator on the marginal generation cost of the reserve capacity in question. In 
case a) the capacity owner may have an incentive to report too low a cost in order to 
increase the probability for being chosen for regulating power generation.  
 
In case b) the capacity owner may, in contrast to case a), have an incentive to report 
cost that is too high. Clearly, this implies that the probability of being chosen for 
regulating power generation diminishes, but the net income will be strictly positive if 
chosen. Finally, in alternative c) the capacity owner may have an incentive of offering 
power to the real time market at a price that is lower than the marginal cost of 
generating the power. This increases the probability that the capacity, that will be kept 
in reserve anyway, will be called upon to generate regulating power. As long as the 
price on regulating power is determined by power from generation plants that are 
offered to the real time market at a higher price, this strategy will be beneficial to a 
rational capacity owner. 
 
9. Provision of regulating power and reserve capacity in practise 
As already concluded two prices are needed to ensure system reliability in a 
liberalized electricity market: A price on regulating power and a price on the capacity 
kept in reserve to make sure that the regulation market with a certain (high) 
probability can clear at all times. Moreover, the second price can either be a premium 
  23on the price of regulating power at times with unusually high demand for regulation 
power, or a capacity price determined on a specific market for “power options” (also 
denoted a “capacity market”). As indicated in the introductory section the Nordic 
countries have opted for the capacity market alternative, let alone in different forms. 
In this section we will describe the organization of regulation and capacity markets in 
the Nordic countries, and relate our observations in the previous section. 
 
The regulation market, RKM 
In September 2002 common rules were established for the use of regulating power for 
achieving balance of generation and demand in the Nordic countries. Regulating 
power is now purchased by the TSOs in Finland (Fingrid), Denmark (Elnet), Norway 
(Statnett) and Sweden (Svenska Kraftnät) from a common price ladder of submitted 
bids. Clearing between TSOs is done on the basis of a single price (i.e. the price of 
regulating power) while the system for “day after” financial clearing between single 
companies and the TSO varies from country to country. In the future the aim is to 
harmonize the rules for “day after” clearing.  
 
In principle, all participants in the electricity market are responsible for balancing the 
provision and use of electricity. A “balance responsible” company often possesses 
generation capacity suitable for regulation (i.e. electricity that may be ramped 
quickly). This implies that the company may participate in the regulation market. 
However, physical “own regulation” is not considered beneficial for the balancing of 
the system, wherefore it is not allowed in Norway and is made uneconomical in some 
of the other countries (i.e. Sweden). The number of balancing responsible companies 
varies in the Nordic countries from around ten in Finland to over one hundred in 
Norway.  
 
The day-ahead market, Elspot, has the important function of providing a common 
price to the participants and to offer the opportunity for the companies to trade so that 
they achieve balance in provision and sale of electricity.  After the closing of this 
market (twenty four hours prior to real time), the balance responsible companies 
submit their plans to the system operator. However, the companies have the additional 
opportunity to adjust their decisions either through bilateral contracts or by using 
Elbas that closes one hour prior to real time (This option is only open to companies in 
  24Finland, Sweden and Eastern Denmark). Within the actual hour of operation the 
system operator ensures balance by using the regulating power market. The day after 
imbalances of each company are settled, i.e. the companies are either required to pay 
for or are compensated for the imbalance depending on the direction of the imbalance.  
 
On the regulating market, bids from companies are collected in a list that is available 
to all the Nordic system operators in a common information system, NOIS (Nordic 
Operational Information System). The system operators use this list to keep the load 
frequency by jointly making decisions on up- or down regulation. In practice local 
imbalance may to a large extent cancel against each other so that the need for 
regulating power for the system operator is less than the sum of the needs of the 
balance responsible companies. On the regulating market the system operator receives 
bids from companies that are willing to either up regulate or down regulate their 
generation or demand. A bid on up regulation involves submitting a price at which the 
company is willing to increase generation or reduce its consumption in a certain 
quantity; likewise for down regulation. Within the hour of operation the system 
operator uses the bids in order of increasing asking price, unless bottlenecks or other 
considerations of supply security make this impossible.  
 
In Norway, Sweden and Finland the participants in the regulating market are all paid 
the highest asking price of the accepted bids within the hour of operation in case of up 
regulation. In case of down regulation all are paid the lowest asking price of the 
accepted bids. In Denmark participants are paid the asking price if their bids are 
accepted. The prices of up- and down regulation determine the regulation price that is 
used for settlement between the system operators for the broader regions. If there are 
no bottlenecks the regulating price is the same in all regions.  
 
In the period after the real time market has been cleared and the regulating price has 
been established the process of balance settlement between the system operators and 
the involved parties commences. The purpose of this is to distribute income and 
expenses for regulating the market. A basic principle applied is that the participant 
that causes an imbalance has to compensate the system operator for its expenses of re-
establishing the balance.  The settlement within the regions between the system 
operator and the participants varies from country to country. Sweden and Denmark 
  25has a system of settling separate imbalances for production, trade and consumption 
whereas Norway and Finland only settle an aggregate balance. Also, the principles of 
settlement pricing vary from country to country. Norway uses a "single price" system 
where the same price is used for both purchase and sale. In the other countries there is 
a "two price" system where the price charged for purchase or the price paid for sale 
depends on whether the purchase or the sale supported or counteracted the aggregate 
balance in the hour of operation. Hence, by this system of asymmetric pricing the 
incentives of being in balance in real time becomes very strong. 
 
Hence, in general one can say that the Nordic balancing system aims at making the 
trade on the real time market as small as possible. In practise a large part of the 
responsibility for balancing is delegated to the balancing responsible companies.  For 
that reason a large part of what would otherwise be trade on the regulating market is 
shifted over to Elspot and Elbas. Therefore, the discussion of how to ensure the 
provision of reserve capacity has involved a discussion of Elspot and Elbas.  
 
There may be reason to question the rationality of having each and every balancing 
company carrying a large part of the responsibility of balancing generation and 
consumption in real time. Clearly, it is the system operator that with his overview 
over the development of demand, the magnitude of reserve power and geographical 
distribution, as well as of the pressure on the “narrow” parts of the transmission 
network, that should have the best conditions of minimizing the cost to society of 
managing the system responsibility. On the other hand one can claim that it is the 
companies that have the best information on relevant generation costs. Therefore, 
provided that the system operator’s pricing of transmission services are efficient i.e. 
that the prices correctly reflect network losses and scarcity of transmission capacity,   
decentralized decisions would lead to the most efficient allocation of available 
resources.   
 
However, if a decentralized solution is to be efficient at least two conditions will have 
to be fulfilled. Firstly, the closing of the  ”last” forward market, i.e. Elbas should be as 
close as possible to real time operations so that big differences can be avoided.       
Clearly, this condition is fulfilled as it is quite exceptional that demand change 
significantly within an hours. The second condition is that Elspot and Elbas always 
  26clear at distinct prices. Even though this is normally the case, situations emerge every 
now and then where Elspot, due to extreme cold weather and thus a continuous high 
demand, is close to not clearing at a distinct price. One reason for this is that the 
demand on the spot market is very price inelastic. Another reason is that the provision 
of peak load capacity is not sufficiently large. Hence, as has been discussed earlier, it 
is an important task to provide a sufficient buffer of reserve capacity that may handle 
situations of occasionally high demand. 
 
The Norwegian capacity market 
A common system of reserve capacity provision is still not in place on the Nordic 
electricity market and the countries have all their own arrangements. For instance, in 
Sweden, the problem of sufficient capacity provision is now being analysed with a 
view to introduce a new arrangement within a few years. Meanwhile, Svenska 
Kraftnät, has signed bilateral contracts with power companies that have agreed to 
keep a certain amount of reserve capacity at Svenska Kraftnät’s disposal.
14  I n  
Norway, however, a whole new power reserve market run by Statnett, was established 
on November 1. 2000.  This is the so called RKOM that will be described further in 
the following. 
 
The RKOM is run by Statnett and comes in addition to the other existing markets.  
This market bears some resemblances with the category of reserve capacity markets 
discussed under “alternative c)” in the previous section. This means that the system 
operator decides how much reserve power is needed during a given period and then 
solicits options for reserve capacity from producers and consumers to fulfill this need. 
Hence, along these lines the RKOM invites participation of both producers and 
consumers (e.g. large consumers in the paper and smelting industry) to place bids on 
the RKOM. The bids are based on size (minimum 25 MW) and an asking price 
(option price). Bids are now weekly but may be presented for 8 weeks at a time. The 
bids for next week may be adjusted until gate closes on Thursday at noon. On 
Thursday between noon and 2 pm Statnett is systematizing and analyzing the amount 
to be purchased.  
 
                                                 
14 This comes in addition to the contracts of the specific “disturbance” reserves that involve 
compensation for keeping instantaneous reserves at Svenska Kraftnät’s disposal. 
  27The price on the RKOM is determined in an auction where the asking price of the last 
accepted offer is paid for all accepted offers. The offers are, however, distributed, 
among three geographical areas as determined by the grid system and normal 
bottleneck situations.  Inside each area it is, in principle, the asking price that 
determines whether an offer is accepted or not. However, Statnett has a certain policy 
of achieving balance between the producer and consumer side that may imply a 
departure from the strict price ladder of acceptance. Otherwise, it should be noted that 
no account is taken of the real cost of power generation of the accepted bids, only the 
asking price matters.   
 
The basic idea is that suppliers accepted on the RKOM market must guarantee to bid 
the accepted volumes of power reserves into the regulating power market, RKM. 
Accepted capacities must be available at 15 minutes warning with full activation for 
at least 1 hour, all days of the week from 06.00 am to 10 pm. There exist sanction 
rules for not complying. In this way Statnett
15 is guaranteed to have a sufficient power 
reserve to draw from as the real time of operation is approaching. An accepted 
supplier called upon to deliver regulating power on RKM, thus gets two kinds of 
remuneration; the option price for capacity and the regulating price for power 
delivered. The payment for regulating power generated is thus determined by the rules 
on the RKM and is the same as regulating power generated by suppliers that are not 
committed on the RKOM. Hence, there is no direct coupling between the RKOM and 
the RKM. 
 
Thus far, experiences from running the RKOM seem to be positive (see Nilssen and 
Walther, 2001). In particular, - as is apparent from Fig. 3, the system has to a large 
extent succeeded in involving the demand side. Also, it seems that the RKOM has 
managed to bring forth a sufficient amount of power to the RKM thus relieving the 
pressure that would otherwise have been on the RKM. It is for instance interesting to 
note that “down regulation” to a large extent also takes place in the “option period” 
from mid November to late April (almost 30 percent of the time during the season 
2004-2005). Price and quantities on the RKOM are reported in Fig. 4. As for the 
                                                 
15 Presently, Statnett considers that about 2000 MW of fast operating reserve is needed in the RKM for 
Norwegian purposes. Statnett has also some bilateral long term contracts with durations of 5-10 years.  
 
  28recent development of this market RKOM has now been made open to other Nordic 
countries with a common bid ladder. Up until now there has been some participation 
from Western Denmark price area. 
 
Fig. 3. Accepted quantity bids (MW) in the Norwegian market for capacity options 




























Fig. 4. Accepted quantity bids (MW) and price (NOK/MW) in the Norwegian market for 
capacity options  (RKOM) from week 47, 2004 to week 16, 2005 in the NOB area 
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10. Conclusion 
The Nordic electricity market has worked well from a system reliability point of view; 
the lights have stayed on even during periods with unusual demand peaks. A key 
factor behind this favourable outcome is that the incentives for keeping sufficient 
reserve capacity have been strong enough. From an institutional point of view the 
reason is that the set of markets that is commonly called “the electricity market” 
includes both regulation and capacity markets, and that these markets function 
sufficiently well.  
 
Yet the institutional design of the Nordic electricity market can be improved. In 
particular the remaining inter-country differences in terms rules and regulations can 
be reduced or even eliminated. Moreover the demand for regulation power could be 
reduced, possibly significantly reduced, if the deviations between the price of 
regulation power and end user electricity prices could be reduced. In practice this 
means that the standard electricity contracts have to be redesigned, so that the 
marginal end user prices better than now reflect the relevant marginal cost of 
electricity. Key to success is also a sizable demand side participation in the emerging 
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